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The psychological state elicited by the classic psychedelics drugs, such as LSD
and psilocybin, is one of the most fascinating and yet least understood states
of consciousness. However, with the advent of modern functional neuroimaging
techniques, the effect of these drugs on neural activity is now being revealed,
although many of the varied phenomenological features of the psychedelic state
remain challenging to explain. Integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the foremost
contemporary theories of consciousness, providing a mathematical formalization of
both the quantity and quality of conscious experience. This theory can be applied to
all known states of consciousness, including the psychedelic state. Using the results
of functional neuroimaging data on the psychedelic state, the effects of psychedelic
drugs on both the level and structure of consciousness can be explained in terms
of the conceptual framework of IIT. This new IIT-based model of the psychedelic
state provides an explanation for many of its phenomenological features, including
unconstrained cognition, alterations in the structure and meaning of concepts and a
sense of expanded awareness. This model also suggests that whilst cognitive flexibility,
creativity, and imagination are enhanced during the psychedelic state, this occurs at the
expense of cause-effect information, as well as degrading the brain’s ability to organize,
categorize, and differentiate the constituents of conscious experience. Furthermore, the
model generates specific predictions that can be tested using a combination of functional
imaging techniques, as has been applied to the study of levels of consciousness during
anesthesia and following brain injury.
Keywords: integrated information theory, psychedelic state, psilocybin, ketamine, LSD, neural complexity,
integration, neural entropy
Introduction
The psychological state elicited by the classic psychedelics drugs, such as LSD and psilocybin,
is one of the most fascinating and yet least understood states of consciousness. Although
biochemical and pharmacological studies of these drugs are detailed and extensive (Nichols,
2004), until recently, studies using human subjects have been limited. However, with the
advent of modern functional neuroimaging techniques and the successful maneuvering around
mulish political obstacles, the neural correlates of the psychedelic state in humans are now
being revealed. This has prompted the development of new models of the effects of these
drugs on neural function and their relationship to the phenomenological features of the
Gallimore The psychedelic state and integrated information theory
psychedelic state (Vollenweider et al., 1997; Carhart-Harris et al.,
2012, 2014).
Integrated information theory (IIT) is one of the foremost
contemporary theories of consciousness (Oizumi et al., 2014).
By mathematically formalizing the properties of subjective
consciousness self-evident to humans, IIT attempts to explain
the conditions under which systems, such as the brain, are
conscious and for the phenomenological structure of conscious
experience. Although IIT is continually under development, it
is now a mature and rigorous theory that considers both the
quantity and quality of consciousness in all its usual states,
including waking, REM, and NREM sleep, during seizures and
under anesthesia. As such, it would be extremely surprising if IIT
had nothing to inform us about the nature of the psychedelic
state. As we appear to be within a growing resurgence of
psychedelic research in humans, it seems entirely appropriate
and timely to analyze the psychedelic state from the perspective
of IIT, with the aim of providing fresh insights into this
beguiling state of consciousness. Furthermore, the mathematical
rigor with which IIT is constructed might allow any such
insights to be similarly formalized, perhaps pointing toward
a more quantitative measure of the psychedelic state and an
explanation for the range of effects of different psychedelic drugs.
Importantly, the most recent models of the psychedelic state,
developed based on functional imaging data (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2014), will be shown not only to be compatible with
IIT, but complemented by it. This analysis will also generate
testable predictions regarding phenomenological features of the
psychedelic state and its neural correlates, and suggest specific
experiments to guide further research.
Phenomenology of the Psychedelic State
The effects of psychedelic drugs on consciousness, particularly at
higher doses, can be both profound and varied (Masters, 1966).
However, the effects can loosely be placed into three categories:
Perceptual effects: altered shapes and colors (often appearing
brighter, more vivid, and intense); visual distortions; visual
hallucinations (open eye visuals and closed eye visuals);
illusions; difficulty focusing; synaesthesias.
Psychic effects: mood alterations (from ecstatic euphoria
to panic); time distortion; thought alterations (difficulty
concentrating, strange concepts, ideas, or connections,
increases in creativity); dreamlike feelings; depersonalization;
the sense that awareness is “expanded”.
Somatic effects: dizziness; tremors; nausea; drowsiness; blurred
vision. (Masters, 1966; Hollister, 1984; Nichols, 2004).
The relative prominence of particular effects can be strongly
dependent on the specific drug, the dosage and the setting in
which the drug is used. As such, it is beyond the scope of
this discussion to attempt an explanation for all the varying
phenomenological features of the psychedelic state elicited by
different psychedelic drugs. However, recent functional imaging
studies suggest that, at relatively low doses of the classic
psychedelic psilocybin, the psychedelic state is characterized by
an unconstrained form of cognition (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012,
2013; Roseman et al., 2014); the stream of conscious experience
appears more fluid and dynamic, with novel neural states being
explored (Tagliazucchi et al., 2014). It is straightforward to
extrapolate this data to account for many of the perceptual
and psychic effects that often manifest in the psychedelic state,
although a more thorough and definitive treatment must await
further human studies.
Functional Neuroimaging of the
Psychedelic State
The classic psychedelic drugs are all partial agonists at the
serotonin 5HT2A receptor, and this site has been established
as the major locus for their effects (Vollenweider et al., 1998;
Nichols, 2004). The earliest functional imaging studies suggested
that psychedelic drugs, psilocybin specifically, are cortical
activators and this was deemed to be consistent with the rich,
heightened state of awareness characteristic of the psychedelic
state (Vollenweider et al., 1997). Further, activation of 5HT2A
receptors is known to depolarize cortical pyramidal neurons. As
such, it was something of a surprise, and ostensibly paradoxical,
when a groundbreaking functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) study with psilocybin revealed a global decrease in
cortical activation (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012). However, recent
magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies localized the activated
pyramidal neurons to the deep layer V of the cortex, which
provide predominantly inhibitory feedback, explaining why
activation of this neural population results in a decrease in neural
activity (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013). The conflict with
earlier data has been explained as an effect of the difference
in temporal resolution between positron emission tomography
(PET) and fMRI. It should be noted that, from the perspective of
IIT, neural activation holds no primacy over deactivation, as both
can be equally informative.
Maximal decreases in activation were observed in cortical
“hubs,” such as the anterior and posterior cingulate cortices (ACC
and PCC) and the thalamus, as well as the medial prefrontal
cortex (mPFC). Further, the intensity of the subjective effects
of the drugs correlated with the magnitude of this deactivation
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2012). Functional connectivity analysis
revealed an uncoupling of activity between the mPFC and the
PCC, both key components of the default mode network (DMN),
indicating a loss of network integrity (Carhart-Harris et al.,
2013; Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013). The DMN, also known
as the task negative network (TNN), is preferentially activated
during introspection, daydreaming and memory retrieval (Qin
and Northoff, 2011). Activation of this network is normally anti-
correlated (inversely coupled) with activation of task positive
networks (TPNs) (Fox et al., 2005), which are activated during
attention-demanding tasks, such as attending to external visual
stimuli. However, both fMRI and MEG revealed a decrease
in the anti-correlation between the DMN and several TPNs,
with an increase in the functional connectivity between these
networks post-psilocybin. Overall, this functional imaging data
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indicates that psilocybin reduces the differentiation between
brain networks and produces a “disorganized” brain state. This
prompted Carhart-Harris and colleagues to propose that the
psychedelic state is characterized by elevated neural entropy—the
so-called “entropic brain” theory (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014).
According to this model, during normal waking
consciousness, the brain operates at a slightly subcritical
state between a highly ordered, low entropy (sub-critical)
state and a highly disordered, high entropy (super-critical)
one (Chialvo, 2010). This optimal position between perfect
order and complete disorder allows the brain to operate in
a well-defined and organized manner whilst maintaining a
degree of pliability, which is essential for flexible and adaptable
cognition. Psychedelic drugs, such as psilocybin, increase the
entropy of the brain and generate a more disordered and fluid
state of consciousness, as revealed by the functional connectivity
analyses. Further, more targeted analyses of the psilocybin fMRI
data showed an increase in the variance of neural activation
across voxels within networks associated with higher cognition,
indicative of more erratic neural activity. A formal measure
of Shannon entropy was also employed and, in line with the
predictions of the entropic brain theory, entropy was indeed
elevated in these networks (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014).
A related approach was used to examine the entropy of the
dynamic temporal sequence of states (discretized as functional
connectivity motifs) explored by the brain post-psilocybin.
Crucially, this analysis not only revealed that the sequence
of states was more random (higher entropy) post-psilocybin,
but also that specific connectivity motifs were exclusive to the
psilocybin state (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014; Tagliazucchi et al.,
2014). This indicates that psilocybin increases both the entropy
of the brain and the size of its state repertoire, which will be of
central importance when considering the psychedelic state from
the perspective of IIT.
Overview of Integrated Information Theory
(IIT)
Before examining the psychedelic state from the perspective
of IIT, it is essential that the key ideas of IIT be presented,
particularly those that will be used in the sections that follow.
However, it is not the aim of this section to provide a detailed
and thorough account of IIT and the reader is directed to Giulio
Tononi’s papers explaining the theory (Oizumi et al., 2014). This
section will serve merely as a simplified overview of IIT, with
particular emphasis placed on those aspects of the theory most
informative to the psychedelic state.
IIT provides a formal description of both the quantity of
consciousness and its quality (structure), both of which might
be affected by psychedelic drugs. In order for a system to be
conscious, it must be both highly differentiated (informative)
and integrated. This means the information generated by the
system as a whole must be beyond that generated by its individual
components. That is, it must be irreducible. IIT proposes that
a set of neural elements (e.g., thalamocortical columns) with
the special property of being a local maximum of integrated
information, quantified by 8 (big phi), is conscious. This set of
neural elements is known as a maximally irreducible conceptual
structure (also known as a complex). Only a complex exists from
its own perspective (there is something-it-is-like-to-be it Nagel,
1974). All conceptual structures, whether maximally irreducible
or not, are defined as systems of concepts. Although a concept
has a formal definition in IIT, this is simply a formalization of
the more familiar definition: an abstract idea or an object of
thought consisting of all the essential or characteristic features
of that object. This could refer to a concrete object, such as
an apple or a chair, but might also refer to something more
abstract, such as the color red or the concept of freedom
or happiness. As concept theory is a major branch of both
classical and contemporary philosophy, it is perhaps safest to opt
for the simplest definition—“concepts are the constituents
of thoughts” (Margolis and Laurence, 2014), although
“constituents of conscious experience” is perhaps a more helpful
definition here.
As conscious experience is built as a system of concepts,
understanding the definition of a concept is central to
understanding how IIT describes the structure of consciousness
and how psychedelic drugs can change it. Assuming the cortical
column is chosen as the basic unit of functional segregation,
each column is an element of the system under consideration
(e.g., a region of the cerebral cortex). Elements can be combined
with other elements to form mechanisms (e.g., a set of directly
or indirectly connected cortical columns engaging in some sort
of causal interaction) (Figure 1). The element itself is the most
elementary mechanism and elements can combine to form
higher order mechanisms. For any set of elements, all possible
mechanisms are represented as the power set, which includes
all possible combinations of elements, including the highest
order mechanism, which is the set itself. Dependent on the
interactions between the elements of the mechanism and, in
fact, with the elements of the entire system (in the case of the
FIGURE 1 | Neural elements within the system form mechanisms (only
2 mechanisms within the power set are shown). The particular current
state of the mechanism is defined by the activity or silence of individual neural
elements and determined by their causal interactions. The complex comprises
the set of neural elements in the system that forms a maximally irreducible
conceptual structure (MICS).
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brain, the synaptic connections, their type, and weight, etc.),
every mechanism occupies a particular state at any point in
time (hereafter its current state). For example, particular sets of
neurons might be firing, whilst others are quiet. As the system
consists of causal, deterministic interactions, only certain system
states could have caused the mechanism to enter its current state.
This set of system states is a discrete probability distribution
called the cause repertoire (IIT uses the term repertoire to
describe various discrete distributions of system states). Likewise,
given the current state of the mechanism, only a specific set
of immediate future states will be available to the system—
this is the effect repertoire. Both of these repertoires may be
referred to together as the cause-effect repertoire (Figure 2). So,
by entering its current state, a mechanism constrains both the
past and future states of the system. In actuality, each individual
mechanism may not constrain the past and future states of the
entire system, but rather of a specific subset of elements called the
purview. Any elements outside of the purview are unconstrained
by the mechanism. However, all of the mechanisms together will
constrain the past and future states of the entire system.
Prior to considering the current state of any mechanisms, all
the possible past and future states of the system form themaximal
entropy unconstrained past and future repertoires, respectively
(i.e., unconstrained by any mechanisms in any specific state). By
entering a specific current state, a mechanism effectively rules
out certain past and future system states (i.e., those past states
that could not have caused the current state and those immediate
future states that cannot follow) and thus generates information.
The amount of information the mechanism specifies about the
past state of the system is called the cause information and is
obtained by calculating the [Earth Mover’s] distance between
the cause repertoire and the unconstrained past repertoire. The
larger the difference between these distributions, the more the
current state of the mechanism constrains the past states of
the system and thus the more cause information is generated.
If the cause information is zero (i.e., there is no difference
between the distributions), the current state of the mechanism
tells us nothing about the past state of the system. Likewise,
the distance between the effect repertoire and the unconstrained
future repertoire quantifies the effect information. The minimum
of the cause and effect information is the cause-effect information
(Figure 2). By systematically bipartitioning the mechanism, it
is possible to calculate the cause-effect information specified
by the whole mechanism above and beyond that specified by
FIGURE 2 | The current state of a mechanism is associated
with a specific cause-effect repertoire of past and future
states of the system. The mechanism generates information by
ruling out certain past and future states, quantified as the distance
between the cause-effect repertoire and the unconstrained
past-future repertoire.
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its parts. This is the integrated information specified by the
mechanism and is known as ϕ (small phi). Overall, the elements
of the mechanism, together with its cause-effect repertoire and
associated value of ϕ, constitute a concept (Figure 3A). The states
of the cause-effect repertoire specify what the concept “is about”
and ϕ quantifies the degree to which that concept is present within
the conscious experience of the system. Every possible mechanism
may, in principle, specify a concept. However, if the mechanism
fails to generate any integrated information (i.e., if ϕ = 0),
then the concept does not exist from the subjective perspective
of the complex (i.e., it is not present within the conscious
experience).
Of all the concepts specified by the system, subsets of these
can form conceptual structures, with each concept represented as
a point in concept space, a high-dimensional space in which each
possible past and future state within the cause-effect repertoire
is represented by one dimension (axis). The coordinates of the
point are given by the probabilities of each past and future state
in the cause-effect repertoire and ϕ is represented by the size
of the point. A conceptual structure thus forms a constellation
of points in concept space (Figure 3B). Whilst each concept
specifies a quantifiable amount of cause-effect information, a
conceptual structure generates conceptual information, which
is the systems equivalent of cause-effect information. The
conceptual information of each concept is found by calculating
the difference between the cause-effect repertoire of the concept
and the unconstrained cause-effect repertoire (known as the
null concept, a concept about nothing). This difference is then
multiplied by the ϕ-value of the concept. Summing over all
the concepts gives the conceptual information generated by the
conceptual structure, denoted 8 (big phi). Clearly, a conceptual
structure with many high-ϕ concepts that are well-separated
from the null concept will generate a large amount of conceptual
information. Conversely, a poorly integrated system with a
FIGURE 3 | (A) The cause-effect repertoire of each mechanism within a
complex, together with its associated ϕ value, constitutes a concept.
The states of the cause-effect repertoire define what the concept “is
about” and ϕ quantifies the degree to which the concept is present in
the experience. (B) Concept (qualia) space is a high-dimensional space
with each cause-effect repertoire state occupying a single axis. Plotting
the concepts on these axes, the conceptual structure forms a shape
in this space that is identified with the conscious experience (qualia).
(Only 3 axes shown with past and future states plotted on separate
axes).
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limited repertoire of states will generate only a small amount of
conceptual information (Oizumi et al., 2014).
In principle, any subset of concepts within the power set
of concepts specified by the system can form a conceptual
structure. However, only one conceptual structure can exist at
any time from the intrinsic perspective of the system—this is
the MICS (complex), which specifies the maximal amount of
integrated conceptual information (8max, hereafter simply 8).
Not all concepts with non-zero ϕwill form part of this irreducible
conceptual structure. This is intuitively obvious, as conscious
experience changes from moment to moment, as concepts
continuously enter and leave consciousness. Concepts that leave
the complex cease to exist from the subjective perspective of the
complex, but may re-enter the complex at a later time.
The subjective conscious experience of the complex is
identified with the complex itself—the level or quantity of
consciousness is identified with the value of 8, whereas the
constellation of concepts determines the structure or quality
of the experience (quale) (Figure 4). Each concept contributes
to the overall experience, with its cause-effect repertoire
determining what that concept “is about” and its ϕ-value
quantifying the degree to which the concept is present in the
experience. Each concept is a point in a high-dimensional qualia
space (this is the same as concept space, except only complexes
(MICS) have qualia) and thus the constellation of concepts form a
“shape” in this space (Balduzzi and Tononi, 2009). It is this shape
that is identified with the quality of the experience. The higher
the dimensionality of the qualia space, the richer the experience
(i.e., the experience is “about more things” at once).
The Psychedelic State and IIT
IIT defines conscious experiences as a shape in qualia space. This
applies to all conscious states, including the psychedelic state.
To appreciate how IIT can provide an explanation for many
FIGURE 4 | The unified conscious complex (outer gray circle) is formed
from a constellation of concepts (yellow circles). The degree to which
each concept is present in the experience is quantified by ϕ (represented by
the size of the circle), and the overall quantity of consciousness is quantified by
8 (represented by the size of the gray circle).
phenomenological features of the psychedelic state, the following
discussion will be separated into three sections. Firstly, using
IIT and results from functional neuroimaging data, the effect
of psychedelic drugs on neural differentiation (i.e., information)
will be examined. Secondly, the effect of psychedelic drugs on
neural integration will be addressed. Finally, experiments to test
whether the psychedelic state is a state of increased consciousness
(integrated information, 8) will be suggested, together with
predictions as to their outcome.
The Effect of Psychedelic Drugs on Information
Functional neuroimaging data and its analysis support the
proposal that psychedelic drugs increase the entropy of the brain
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2014), producing a state of unconstrained
cognition. More detailed analysis of this data revealed an increase
in the repertoire of states explored by the brain, consistent with
an increase in neural entropy (Tagliazucchi et al., 2014). From
the perspective of IIT, both of these observations can be further
elucidated, both at the level of the mechanism (concept) and at
the level of the conceptual structure (complex).
Before discussing the effect of psychedelic drugs at the level of
the concept, it is important to clarify exactly how information
is defined within IIT. It is erroneous, from the perspective of
IIT at least, to equate the size of a system’s state repertoire
(i.e., the number of states it can potentially occupy) with the
information it generates. Although a large repertoire of states is
necessary for a system to generate a large amount of information,
it is not sufficient. Stated equivalently, increasing the size of
the state repertoire does not necessarily imply an increase in
information as defined by IIT. The amount of cause-effect
information generated by a mechanism depends on the number
of past and future states it rules out by entering its current
state. Simply adding noise to a system by, for example, allowing
neural elements to be randomly activated, will increase the state
repertoire but will not increase information. This is because the
current state of the system is unable to constrain random past or
future states. Equivalently, the current state gives no information
about those states that had no causal effect on it, nor about
randomly generated future states.
Any IIT derived model of the psychedelic state must account
for the increase in entropy and size of the state repertoire
explored by the brain. In fact, this functional imaging data can
be regarded as axiomatic and used as a foundation upon which
to develop an IIT-based model of the psychedelic state. As IIT
constructs conscious experience as a system of concepts, it makes
most sense to begin at the level of the mechanism and then move
to the level of the conceptual structure (complex).
When a mechanism enters a specific state, the cause and effect
repertoires of system states are specified as distributions with
lower entropy than the corresponding unconstrained past and
future repertoires. The cause-effect information generated by the
mechanism entering the current state is the minimum distance
between these repertoires, as explained earlier. This provides
a measure of how much the mechanism constrains past and
future states of the system. The functional imaging data described
earlier revealed that, post-psilocybin, the brain explores a larger
repertoire of states and in a more random fashion. From the
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perspective of IIT, this suggests that the brain’s past and future
states are less constrained by the states of its mechanisms. As
will be shown, and in agreement with this imaging data, this
is equivalent to stating that the entropy of the cause and effect
repertoires is increased. This means that the cause and effect
repertoires of the mechanisms in the complex are shifted toward
the unconstrained past and future repertoires. Mathematically,
this can be modeled by taking a linear combination of the
cause repertoire and the unconstrained past repertoire to
generate a psychedelic cause repertoire (Figure 5A). A psychedelic
effect repertoire can be similarly generated, by taking a linear
combination of the effect repertoire and the unconstrained future
repertoire. This approach takes into account the repertoire of
states available to the system without invoking additional states
resulting from random noise, and can be applied to both the
cause repertoire and the effect repertoire to generate a psychedelic
cause-effect repertoire for every mechanism in the complex (Note
that this model does not explain how neural entropy is increased
by psilocybin, but predicts consequences of the entropy increase
revealed by functional imaging data).
If the unconstrained repertoire (past or future), U, contains
n states, then U can be described as a point within an (n-
1)-dimensional n-simplex. The cause or effect repertoire, R, is
another point within this simplex and extending a line between
R and U generates a range of repertoires moving from R to U,
all of them linear combinations of R and U with increasing U-
character. According to this model, the psychedelic repertoire,
R′, lies somewhere on this R–U line (this is easier to understand
using a diagram and is illustrated in Figure 5B for a system with
only three possible states):
R′ = (1− t)R + tU
where t is the portion of U mixed with R and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Clearly,
if t = 0, then R′ = R, and if t = 1, then R′ = U.
As U is, by definition, the maximal entropy distribution, a
linear combination ofU and Rwill always generate a distribution
with higher entropy than R. Furthermore, in order to move
the cause-effect repertoire closer to these maximum entropy
distributions, the probabilities of the individual states must be
changed, such that formerly high probability states become lower
probability and vice versa. Importantly, this is certain to include
increasing the probability of certain states from zero or, at least,
from a very low probability. In other words, new states would
effectively be added to the cause-effect repertoire—the repertoire
of potential system states, both past and future, is expanded
(actually, the number of states does not increase, but certain
states develop a non-zero probability). As this applies to all
mechanisms in the complex, the brain would be observed to
explore a larger number of states in a more random fashion. This
is exactly what is observed in the functional imaging data. From a
phenomenological perspective, this has important consequences
for the structure of the concept itself. The states within the cause-
effect repertoire define what the concept “is about” (Oizumi et al.,
2014) and so an expansion of these states essentially changes
the nature of the concept and what that concept means to
the individual—the psychedelic concept becomes “about more
things” or acquires additional characteristics not present in
normal consciousness (Figure 6). It is interesting to speculate
that this might account for the feeling that the world appears
somewhat altered in the psychedelic state. Concepts that were
once clear and well-defined become novel, strange and perhaps
even bizarre or ludicrous.
Further insights are obtained by examining the effect of
psychedelic drugs on the cause-effect information specified by
each mechanism. The current presentation of IIT uses the Earth
FIGURE 5 | (A) Simple 3-state system. A psychedelic (cause/effect)
repertoire, R’, is generated using a linear combination of the
(cause/effect) repertoire, R, and the unconstrained (past/future)
repertoire, U. R’ has a higher entropy than R and is closer to U,
generating less (cause/effect) information. (B) Each repertoire can be
plotted on a 3-simplex. The psychedelic repertoire, R’, lies on a
line between the (cause/effect) repertoire and the unconstrained
repertoire.
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FIGURE 6 | A concept can be visualized by plotting the states of the
cause-effect repertoire on a set of arbitrary axes, with the length of
each line representing the probability of each state (ϕ not considered).
(A) A concept in a normal waking state. (B) A higher-dimensional psychedelic
state concept, derived using the linear combination method described in the
text.
Mover’s Distance (EMD, aka Wasserstein metric) to measure the
distance between the distributions in calculating the cause-effect
information (Oizumi et al., 2014). The EMD between the cause
or effect repertoire, R, and the unconstrained repertoire, U, can
be defined as follows:
If X and Y are random variables with distributions R and U,
respectively, and d(X,Y) is a [Euclidean] distance metric, then
the infimum of the expectation, E, taken over all possible joint
distributions of X and Y (with R and U being the marginal
distributions, respectively), gives the EMD:
EMD(R||U) = inf E[d (X,Y)]
Let X∗ and Y∗ be random variables with distributions R and U,
respectively, which attain the infimum in the definition of the
EMD, then:
EMD(R||U) = E[d
(
X∗,Y∗
)
]
R is combined with U using the method described above
to generate a new distribution (the psychedelic cause/effect
repertoire), R′:
R′ = (1− t)R + tU
where 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
Now, to calculate EMD(R′||U) (i.e., the distance between the
psychedelic repertoire, R′, and the unconstrained repertoire, U),
we must define a new random variable, X′, with distribution, R′,
such that:
EMD(R′||U) = inf E[d
(
X′,Y∗
)
]
where,
X′ =
{
X∗, P(1− t)
Y∗, P(t)
Since EMD(R′||U) is, by definition, the infimum, it must always
be the case that:
EMD(R′||U) ≤ E[d
(
X′,Y∗
)
]
Moreover:
E
[
d
(
X′,Y∗
)]
= (1− t)E
[
d
(
X∗,Y∗
)]
+ tE[d
(
Y∗,Y∗
)
]
And so, equivalently:
EMD(R′||U) ≤ (1 − t)E
[
d
(
X∗,Y∗
)]
+ tE[d
(
Y∗,Y∗
)
]
Since, plainly:
E
[
d
(
Y∗,Y∗
)]
= 0
This simplifies to:
EMD(R′||U) ≤ (1 − t)E
[
d
(
X∗,Y∗
)]
As defined earlier:
EMD(R||U) = E[d
(
X∗,Y∗
)
]
So, substituting:
EMD(R′||U) ≤ (1 − t)EMD(R||U)
And, since 0 ≤ (1− t) ≤ 1, it follows that:
(1 − t)EMD(R||U) ≤ EMD(R||U)
And so:
EMD(R′||U) ≤ EMD(R||U)
So, increasing the entropy of the cause-effect repertoire will
always lead to a reduction in its distance, as measured using the
EMD, from the unconstrained past and future repertoires and
hence a reduction in the cause-effect information specified by the
mechanism.
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Without considering any effect on neural integration, this
result suggests a continuum of consciousness between the normal
waking state and unconsciousness, with the psychedelic state
lying somewhere in between, perhaps at varying distances from
normal consciousness depending on the drug and dose. However,
there is no reason to assume that the classic psychedelics are
capable of producing such a maximal entropy state. Indeed, even
high doses of psychedelics, such as psilocybin or LSD, are not
accompanied by any appreciable loss of consciousness. The N-
methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor antagonist, ketamine, is
an unusual drug in that low to moderate doses have a definite
psychedelic effect (Krystal et al., 1994; Gunduz-Bruce, 2009;
Murray et al., 2013), whereas higher doses induce anesthesia. It
is tempting to suggest that lower doses have a moderate effect on
neural entropy, producing a psychedelic state in the samemanner
as psilocybin, for example, whereas higher doses cause a more
dramatic increase in neural entropy that reduces cause-effect
information such that 8 becomes minimal and consciousness
is lost. Additionally, or alternatively, ketamine may have a more
profound disruptive effect on neural integration than the classic
psychedelics, as is seen with other anesthetic agents (Ferrarelli
et al., 2010). These different effects ought to be distinguishable
using functional imaging techniques.
This reduction in cause-effect information will also affect
its φ-value; the degree to which the concept is present in
the experience will be altered. It is tempting to insist that
the concept’s φ will necessarily decrease owing to a reduction
in the cause-effect information. However, φ depends not only
on the cause-effect information, but also on the degree to
which this information is integrated. If psychedelic drugs act to
increase integration across the cortex (discussed later), then it
is possible that φ may actually increase. Further, it is possible
that concepts with zero or very low φ, which don’t exist to
any significant extent during normal waking consciousness, may
become present during the psychedelic state. As such, certain
concepts experienced during the psychedelic state might simply
not be available to someone who hasn’t taken the drug and
these concepts could have no relation to anything within the
individual’s normal conscious experience.
In summary, the effect of a psychedelic drug at the level
of the concept is to increase the entropy of the cause-effect
repertoire and, effectively, expand the number of available states
within the repertoire, but reduce the cause-effect information
specified by each mechanism as it enters its current state.
This means that the mechanisms constrain past and future
states of the brain less stringently; the current state of each
mechanism is less informative about the brain’s past and future
states. This result agrees with imaging data showing that the
brain explores an expanded repertoire of states in a more
random fashion (Tagliazucchi et al., 2014), and resting state
functional connectivity analysis suggesting networks become
less differentiated (less anti-correlated) from each other in
the psychedelic state (Roseman et al., 2014). As the DMN
and TPNs are strongly anti-correlated during normal waking
consciousness, states involving the DMN effectively “rule out”
many states involving the TPNs, and vice versa, thus generating
a large amount of information. The decrease in anti-correlation
observed post-psilocybin means that DMN states are less
effective at ruling out TPN states, thus reducing the information
generated.
From the level of the concept, it is straightforward to
extrapolate to the level of the conceptual structure and thus the
quale. Changing both the cause-effect repertoire and φ-values
of the concepts within the conceptual structure, and perhaps
also incorporating additional concepts (i.e., those whose φ-
value becomes non-zero), changes the shape of the structure in
qualia space. Whether the integrated conceptual information,
8, increases or decreases will depend on the effect on the
individual concepts and how the psychedelic drug affects
information integration (discussed later). However, recall that the
dimensionality of qualia space is equal to the total number of
states in the cause-effect repertoires of the constituent concepts.
It is this dimensionality that determines the “richness” (Tononi,
2012) of the experience. Whilst it is not trivial to predict the
effect on 8 (although suggestions for experiments to probe
this issue will be discussed later), expanding the cause-effect
repertoires of the concepts within the conceptual structure will
generate a higher-dimensional quale that is experientially richer
than normal waking consciousness—the psychedelic state is
“about more things” than the normal waking state. The enhanced
richness and expanded awareness of the psychedelic experience
can thus be explained as an increase in the dimensionality
of qualia space, rather than an increase in cortical activation.
However, it is important to note that a “richer” conscious state
does not necessarily imply an increase in the overall quantity of
consciousness (quantified by 8). In fact, as shown above, there
is an inherent tension between cause-effect information and the
dimensionality of the concepts and thus the quale. Despite this,
cause-effect information is specified at the level of the concept,
and it is conceivable, if integration is enhanced, that an increase in
the number of concepts [with non-zeroφ] could result in elevated
8, even though the φ associated with individual concepts might
fall. It isn’t, therefore, a contradiction to suggest that both the
richness and the quantity of consciousness might increase in the
psychedelic state.
Overall, this model suggests that the expanded awareness and
enhancement of cognitive flexibility afforded by the psychedelic
drugs comes at a functional cost: increasing the entropy of the
cause-effect repertoires of mechanisms within a complex expands
the characteristics and meaning of concepts and produces a
richer, more flexible state of consciousness (a greater range
of brain states can be explored), but this is at the expense
of the cause-effect information associated with each concept.
This provides an elegant explanation for the need to optimize
neural entropy—a very low entropy (highly ordered) state would
maximally constrain past and future states of the brain and
thus maximize cause-effect information. However, this would
collapse the number of states within the cause-effect repertoire
of each mechanism and thus produce a highly inflexible state
of consciousness with a rigid sequence of conscious states. At
the opposite extreme, excessively high entropy would maximize
the number of states within the cause-effect repertoire of each
mechanism, producing a highly flexible state of consciousness
with the potential for creative and novel cognition. However,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 346
Gallimore The psychedelic state and integrated information theory
the cause-effect information specified by each mechanism would
be very low; the mechanisms would fail to constrain the past
and future states of the brain. If entropy is optimal, cause-
effect information is high whilst a degree of cognitive flexibility
is retained. Psychedelic drugs push the brain into a slightly
higher entropy state, which is experientially richer and more
flexible, but not as informative as normal waking consciousness
(Figure 7). An intuitive way of appreciating this reduction in
information is to consider that entropy is also a measure of
uncertainty. High entropy states are less informative because
they contain a greater uncertainty about the past states that
caused the current state, and those states that will follow it. This
potential for novel (and uncertain) state pathways makes it more
difficult to make sense of the progression of conscious moments,
and can be visualized by projecting forwards and backwards
in time from the current state of the system. As one moves
further from the current time, the number of potential system
states increases. This generates a double “reality cone” projecting
outwards from the current moment, representing the “spotlight”
of consciousness into the past and future. By increasing the
number of potential neural states, psychedelic drugs expand
these reality cones, broadening the spotlight, but perhaps at
the expense of focusing attention, organizing thoughts, and
maintaining cognitive control (Figure 8).
By considering how psychedelics restructure concepts (and
thus consciousness), it is possible to view the functional cost, and
potential benefits, of psychedelics from a different perspective.
We can use the example of two concepts in normal waking
consciousness (Figure 9A). Although each concept forms a
distinct shape in concept space, it is possible that they share a
non-zero number of states. Some degree of conceptual overlap
makes perfect sense, since not all concepts are independent.
To use a trivial but concrete example from everyday life,
the concept of an apple is not independent of the concept
of an orange: they differ in enough characteristics such that
they can be distinguished (e.g., color and texture), but they
share enough that they can be connected and categorized (e.g.,
FIGURE 7 | Increasing neural entropy elevates cognitive flexibility at
the expense of a decrease in the cause-effect information specified by
individual mechanisms.
sweet, edible fruits). As demonstrated, the cause-effect repertoire
representing a psychedelic concept possesses additional states not
present in normal consciousness (Figure 9B). As these additional
characteristics are not necessarily systematically acquired, but
through an increase in entropy, conceptual overlap between
certain concepts will inevitably increase, potentially even between
those that are not normally related. This might explain why
creativity, imagination, and novel thinking are enhanced during
the psychedelic state (Sessa, 2008; Jones et al., 2009; Frecska
et al., 2012), but it is straightforward to see how this could
degrade the brain’s ability to maintain the organization and
differentiation of the concepts within conscious experience—an
obviously essential adaptive skill. Small degrees of conceptual
overlap could progress to a more outright conceptual blending,
as the boundaries between concepts are dissolved, and might
explain why Albert Hofmann, during the first ever LSD trip, was
startled to observe:
“The lady next door, whom I scarcely recognized. . .was no
longer Mrs. R., but rather a malevolent, insidious witch with a
colored mask.”(Hofmann, 1980)
This experience could be interpreted as the conceptual blending
of the concept of “Mrs. R” with the concept of a “malevolent
witch.” Although these are not fully independent concepts,
meaning they have a degree of conceptual overlap (e.g., both
are female, and certainly they shared additional characteristics
not revealed in the text), they are held distinct in normal
consciousness. As the concept of “Mrs. R” acquired additional
characteristics in Hofmann’s psychedelic state, conceptual
FIGURE 8 | Moving backward or forward in time from the current state
of the complex, the number of potential states increases, producing a
double “reality cone” extending into the past and the future. The area of
the circular section at each time point represents the number of potential
states. Psychedelic drugs increase the number of potential past and future
states, expanding the reality cones.
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FIGURE 9 | (A) A pair of concepts with a degree of conceptual
overlap (shared states [in cause repertoire only for clarity] are
indicated by dashed lines). (B) In the psychedelic state, the
concepts increase in dimensionality, acquiring additional states. This
increases the degree of conceptual overlap (i.e., the number of
shared states).
overlap may have increased between these concepts, such
that Hofmann failed to distinguish between them: from his
perspective, Mrs. R effectively became the malevolent witch. It is
also possible that conceptual blending could result in a failure to
distinguish concepts related to self from concepts related to other,
perhaps explaining the “ego dissolution” (Carhart-Harris et al.,
2012; Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013) and the sense of “oceanic
boundlessness” (Vollenweider, 2001) that are often feature in
high-dose psychedelic experiences.
Carhart-Harris et al. (2014) suggest that neural entropy
must be suppressed to allow the brain to “organize and
constrain cognition.” This IIT-basedmodel reaches an equivalent
conclusion: entropy is suppressed to maximize cause-effect
information and maintain the organization, categorization, and
differentiation of concepts, which is essential for adaptively
interacting with the world. However, this certainly doesn’t mean
that the psychedelic state of consciousness is without value. By
expanding the reality cone and promoting conceptual overlap,
the high entropy state facilitates creativity, novel thinking, and
imagination, which are obviously of great importance in human
cognition. Furthermore, psychedelics are beginning to show
great promise as psychotherapeutic agents in the treatment of
depression, anxiety, and obsessive compulsive disorder (Moreno
and Delgado, 1997; Berman et al., 2000; aan het Rot et al., 2010;
Buchborn et al., 2014), perhaps by allowing sufferers to break out
of the inflexible and circular modes of thinking that characterize
these conditions (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014).
The Effect of Psychedelic Drugs on Neural
Integration
So far, only the effects of psychedelic drugs on neural
differentiation has been considered and it has been implicitly
assumed that the set of neural elements that constitutes
the maximally integrated conceptual structure (complex)
are unchanged by the drug. However, this is certainly an
unreasonable assumption. At any point in time there should
be a dominant complex of high 8 that comprises a specific
set of neural elements across the cortex. However, even during
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 11 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 346
Gallimore The psychedelic state and integrated information theory
normal waking consciousness, this is likely to be highly dynamic,
with the composition of the complex changing from moment
to moment, as certain subsets of neural elements are excluded
from, or brought into, the complex (Oizumi et al., 2014). The
phenomenology of the psychedelic state, which can include
synesthesia and expanded awareness, might suggest that the
integrated complex is more expansive during the psychedelic
state, encompassing more of the cortex (i.e., more neural
elements within the complex), but more empirical measures of
integration are required.
Neural integration is commonly measured by the
synchronization of neural activation –functional connectivity
analysis using fMRI and coherence analysis to assess oscillatory
synchrony using EEG or MEG. However, it is important to
distinguish between functional and effective connectivity.
Functional connectivity refers to the temporal correlations
between spatially remote neurophysiological events (Friston,
1994), but provides no direct information about the origin of
these correlations. Effective connectivity describes the causal
influence of neural systems over each other (Friston, 1994).
Once functional connectivity has been observed, measures
of effective connectivity must be used to establish the nature
of the causal interactions between neural systems (i.e., the
effective connectivity); functional connectivity alone does not
necessarily imply effective connectivity (Friston, 1994; Lee et al.,
2003). In order to establish neural integration as defined by
IIT, it is essential that effective connectivity be established, as
it is the causal interactions between neural elements that are
fundamental to generating an irreducible complex.
The phase synchronization of neural oscillations across a
range of frequency bands has become the dominant model to
explain how integration is achieved (Varela et al., 2001), as well as
specific thalamocortical circuits regulating information transfer
between disparate cortical regions (Guillery and Sherman,
2002). Phase locking allows disparate cortical columns to
engage in synchronized causal interactions, and neural elements
can exchange and share information via forced oscillations,
resonant loops, and transient oscillatory coupling (Buzsaki,
2006). Synchronization can occur across a range of spatial
scales; local integration might refer to synchronized activity
within a single cortical column or within a tight cluster of
functionally related columns. Large-scale integration can include
the synchronization of neural assemblies separated by great
distances, between lobes or across hemispheres. The dense
and reciprocal connections between thalamocortical columns
enable a large number of neural elements to synchronize
within a few hundred milliseconds to generate a unified,
integrated neuronal assembly (Tononi et al., 1998; Tononi and
Edelman, 2000). Oscillations in the gamma range (30–100Hz)
have received the most attention with regards to perceptual
integration (Varela et al., 2001; Merker, 2013; Burwick, 2014)
and such oscillations coexist with perceptual binding during
normal waking consciousness (Gray and Singer, 1989; Joliot
et al., 1994) and during dreaming (Llinas and Ribary, 1993). In
fact, the synchronization of gamma oscillations unconstrained by
sensory input has been invoked as a model for hallucinations and
perceptual aberrations that occur during psychosis and in certain
psychedelic states (Behrendt, 2003; Behrendt and Young, 2004).
Synchronous firing of fast-spiking inhibitory interneurons, which
strongly inhibit cortical pyramidal cells, generates cortical
gamma oscillations (Cardin et al., 2009). Pertinently, these
oscillations are regulated by 5HT1A and 5HT2A receptors on both
pyramidal cells and their associated fast-spiking interneurons
(Puig et al., 2010). 5HT1A activation is largely inhibitory on both
types of cell and 5HT2A activation is excitatory. By activating
fast-spiking interneurons, 5HT2A activation potentiates cortical
gamma oscillations and their synchronization, whilst 5HT1A
activation suppresses them (Puig et al., 2010; Puig and Gulledge,
2011). As the classical psychedelics are partial agonists at the
5HT2A receptor, it is tempting to suggest that the combination
of pyramidal cell depolarization and the promotion of gamma
oscillations might explain many of the perceptual effects of these
drugs. Increased sensitivity to incoming sensory data coupled
with the generation of highly coherent gamma oscillations less
constrained by external sensory inputs might result in the
perceptual distortions, illusions and even hallucinations observed
in the psychedelic state. Furthermore, as gamma oscillations
are closely associated with neural integration, it is reasonable
to surmise that the psychedelic state might be characterized
by an increase in integration compared to a normal waking
state. Although limited to measuring temporal correlations,
coherence analysis of EEG and MEG traces is often used to
quantify neural integration and studies exist that employed
this technology to measure the effect of psychedelic drugs,
including psilocybin, LSD, and ayahuasca (containing N,N-
dimethyltryptamine, DMT) on brain function. However, the
effect of these drugs on coherence is not consistent across all
studies. A small study employing quantitative EEG (QEEG) to
measure changes in oscillatory power and coherence following
ayahuasca ingestion observed a highly integrated brain state
(Stuckey et al., 2005). Dramatic increases in gamma coherence
were widely distributed across the cortex, but especially over the
occipital lobe (Stuckey et al., 2005). This is consistent with an
earlier study showing an increase in power in the gamma band in
ayahuasca users (Don et al., 1998). However, this result contrasts
with other studies that found generalized decreases in power
across all frequency bands (Riba et al., 2002, 2004).
A more recent psilocybin MEG study (Muthukumaraswamy
et al., 2013) suggested that the psychedelic state is one of “dis-
integrated” neural activity, with reduction in both oscillatory
power and synchronization observed across all frequency
bands. The authors suggest that this desynchronization results
from 5HT2A-mediated excitation of deep layer pyramidal cells.
However, it is noteworthy that the fMRI functional connectivity
motifs unique to the post-psilocybin state were the most highly
connected possible (Tagliazucchi et al., 2014). A disintegration
of DMN integrity does not necessarily imply a reduction in
overall neural integration and, indeed, an increase in between-
network functional connectivity was consistently observed post-
psilocybin (Roseman et al., 2014). This is further supported
by a later network analysis of the psilocybin fMRI functional
connectivity data, which shows the post-psilocybin state to be
characterized by an increase in the integration between cortical
areas (Petri et al., 2014). Together, this data suggests that
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psilocybin disrupts the organization of neural integration, but
the overall effect appears to be an increase in the degree of
integration.
Although this data is highly suggestive, the major limitation
of functional connectivity and coherence analyses with regards
to neural integration is that these temporal correlations do not
necessarily imply effective connectivity. For example, propofol-
induced anesthesia is associated with hypersynchronous
oscillations in the alpha band (Supp et al., 2011), and yet effective
connectivity, and thus integration as defined by IIT, is markedly
reduced (Schroter et al., 2012; Casali et al., 2013; Gomez et al.,
2013). Also, inferring causal interactions from functional
imaging data requires additional techniques (Lee et al., 2003),
including cortical perturbation approaches, discussed below.
The currently available functional imaging data falls short of
providing a definitive account of the effect of psychedelic drugs
on neural integration across the brain. If the psychedelic state is
to be understood as either a state of heightened consciousness
or, conversely, a state of lower consciousness that lies between
wakefulness and sleep, then techniques for measuring both
information and integration concurrently must be considered.
Measurement of Integrated Information in the
Psychedelic State
Although the cause-effect information specified by individual
mechanisms should be lower in the psychedelic state compared
to normal waking consciousness, concomitant with increased
neural entropy and reduced differentiation between network
states, the psychedelic state is not associated with any experiential
drop in consciousness. In fact, most individuals feel a heightened
sense of alertness and awareness under the influence of a
psychedelic drug, rather than feeling that their consciousness
is fading (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012). However, this is not
a particularly reliable indicator of the effect of the drug on
8 and it isn’t trivial to predict how integrated information
might change when entering the psychedelic state from normal
waking consciousness. As 8 is identified with the quantity
of consciousness, an approximate measure of the effect of
psychedelic drugs on this value would be extremely informative,
revealing whether the psychedelic state is truly a state of
increased or decreased consciousness and perhaps differentiating
between the effects of classic psychedelics, such as psilocybin, and
psychedelic anesthetics, such as ketamine.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) coupled with
EEG can be used to measure the response of the brain to
direct perturbation of targeted cortical regions. Crucially, this
approach separates effective connectivity (causal interactions)
from functional connectivity (temporal correlations) (Massimini
et al., 2005). During wakefulness, TMS stimulation produces
a complex (differentiated) pattern of activity that becomes
widely distributed across interacting cortical areas (integrated).
However, during NREM sleep, the activity generated by TMS
remains localized to the stimulation area, indicating a loss
of effective connectivity (integration) (Massimini et al., 2005;
Esser et al., 2009). This effect is also observed in the loss of
consciousness produced by general anesthetics (Ferrarelli et al.,
2010). Specific indices of cortical effective connectivity—and
thus integration—can be used to quantify the spread of the
TMS stimulus response (Ferrarelli et al., 2010) and could be
useful in measuring the effect of psychedelic drugs on neural
integration.
The TMS-EEG technique has been used to develop the
Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI), an empirical measure of
integrated information designed to differentiate between levels of
consciousness in both healthy individuals and those with severe
neurological injury (Casali et al., 2013; Sarasso et al., 2014). The
PCI is calculated using the algorithmic compressibility of the
EEG data generated following TMS perturbation. If integration
is low, the TMS response is spatially restricted and the PCI is low.
Likewise, if the response is stereotypical and undifferentiated,
the EEG data will be highly compressible and the PCI will
also be low. However, if the TMS perturbation produces a
complex spatiotemporal pattern of activity that spreads to a large
set of integrated areas, then the data cannot be compressed
and the resulting PCI is high. The PCI is thus a measure of
both the informational content and the integration of neural
activity. Other entropy measures fail to differentiate between
the information generated by the causal interactions of neural
elements and random noise. This technique, however, only
measures information resulting from deterministic interactions
between neural groups. The PCI is successful in distinguishing
between wakefulness and unconsciousness, both during deep
sleep and anesthesia, and appears to be sensitive to graded
changes in the level of consciousness (Casali et al., 2013). As such,
it is conceivable that it could detect any difference in the level of
TABLE 1 | Phenomenological features of the psychedelic state and their
IIT correlates.
IIT Correlate Phenomenological Features
Increased entropy of
cause-effect repertoires, moving
closer to unconstrained
past-future repertoires
Conscious experience is more fluid,
dynamic, and unconstrained
Number of non-zero probability
states in cause-effect repertoires
increases
Meaning of concepts is altered, acquiring
additional characteristics. Some concepts
become associated with others in unusual
ways because of enhanced conceptual
overlap. Imagination and creativity is
enhanced
φ-value of mechanisms is
altered. φ-value of some
mechanisms may increase from
zero
The relative prominence of concepts in the
experience changes. Some concepts
become less noticeable, whilst others “pop
out.” Completely novel concepts may also
appear
Dimensionality of qualia space
increased
Conscious experience seems richer and
there is a sense of expanded awareness
Decrease in cause-effect
information specified by
individual mechanisms
Although awareness is expanded, there is a
struggle to organize thoughts, to
focus/concentrate, solve problems, and
make sense of the world and the
progression of conscious moments in the
normal way
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consciousness between normal wakefulness and the psychedelic
state.
Conclusions, Predictions, and Future Work
The task of the brain in shaping conscious experience has
previously been framed as a problem of minimizing entropy
whilst maintaining cognitive flexibility (Carhart-Harris et al.,
2014). By examining the psychedelic state from the perspective of
IIT, we have been able to equivalently restate the problem as the
optimization of cause-effect information and cognitive flexibility.
Psychedelic drugs increase cognitive flexibility (enhancing
creativity, novel thinking, and imagination) but sacrifice a
degree of cause-effect information specified by each mechanism
(concept) within the conscious complex; each mechanism
constrains the past and future states of the brain less stringently.
This is a novel insight, as it contrasts with a simple Shannon
interpretation of entropy increase, which would equate it with
an increase in information. A decrease in information makes
more sense, as it explains why the psychedelic state, although
being a state of “expanded awareness,” might be non-optimal
in terms of organizing and constraining cognition, categorizing,
and differentiating concepts, and generally making sense of the
progression of conscious moments. Furthermore, using this IIT-
based model, it is possible to move beyond neural correlates
and predict specific phenomenological features of the psychedelic
state (Table 1).
Despite reducing cause-effect information, from an
experiential perspective, there is no indication that the classic
psychedelics reduce the quantity of consciousness. In fact,
quite the opposite appears to be the case—consciousness seems
enhanced or elevated. Although this is not a reliable indicator
as to the effect on 8, which must be measured empirically,
a tentative prediction can be made: any drug that increases
neural entropy will produce a psychedelic state by expanding the
number of states within the cause-effect repertoires of individual
mechanisms, reducing the differentiation between network
states and resulting in a state of unconstrained cognition and
expanded awareness. However, the classic psychedelics (such
as psilocybin) are able to maintain neural integration, and thus
8 and consciousness, whilst reducing cause-effect information.
Although functional imaging data strongly supports this idea, it
should be possible to test this more definitively using a TMS-EEG
methodology. Psychedelic anesthetics, such as ketamine, whilst
elevating neural entropy and so generating a form of psychedelic
state, may lack the ability to maintain neural integration and,
as with other anesthetics, lead to a breakdown of effective
connectivity and unconsciousness in high doses (Ferrarelli et al.,
2010). Again, this distinction ought to be measurable using
TMS-EEG and other functional neuroimaging techniques.
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